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London

Mobile ALPRs deployed

Dan Meinen

Ward 7 Councillor Candidate

Opposes ALPRs

Dan Meinen, a candidate for Ward 7 Councillor in London's October 2026 election, opposes fixed ALPR cameras. In his response to panopti.ca's questionnaire, Meinen said he would vote no on any fixed ALPR procurement, renewal, or expansion — regardless of the retention limits proposed — because logging every passing plate, not just plates tied to an investigation, builds a detailed, permanent record of where ordinary people travel. Failing an outright refusal, he would demand the strictest limits: immediate deletion of non-matching data, retention of matches only as long as an active investigation requires under judicial oversight, access limited to named officers with every query logged, no sharing with third parties or other agencies, and annual independent audits. He would permit no data-sharing with other police services, federal agencies, or entities outside Canada — "that is how local cameras become part of a national surveillance system" — and would make a public privacy impact assessment a mandatory bylaw requirement. Meinen would redirect the money to investigative capacity, crisis-response and diversion teams, and crime prevention through environmental design. His answers appear below in his own words.

Questionnaire responses

Q1 — Support or oppose fixed ALPRs — questionnaire response, 2026-08-25
No. The potential for the storage of this data is a massive privacy concern, and logging every plate that passes, not just license plates tied to an investigation is a concern. The data of where ordinary people travel, and the detailed records built up over time is a massive concern about how it's being used, and who is using it.
Q2 — How would you vote on procurement? — questionnaire response, 2026-08-25
I would vote no regardless of the proposed retention limits.
Q3 — Limits on ALPR data — questionnaire response, 2026-08-25
My starting position is that the best limit of ALPR data is not collecting it at all. But, if a system exists or the board proceeds over my objection, I would fight for; 1. Retention - Data that doesn't match any records deleted immediately. Data that has a match tied to an active investigation can be only retained as long as the investigation requires with judicial oversight but not any longer. 2. Access - Heavily restricted, only named officers and every single query logged. No bulk reporting, and absolutely no sharing with third parties, and no sharing with data with other agencies. 3. Annual Independent audits.
Q4 — Data-sharing with other agencies — questionnaire response, 2026-08-25
No. That is how local cameras become part of a national surveillance system.
Q5 — Public consultation & privacy assessment — questionnaire response, 2026-08-25
Public privacy impact assessment should be a mandatory bylaw requirement. Genuine consultation, public meetings, and enough time for residents to actually respond need to take place before a system like this ever deploys.
Q6 — Where the money should go — questionnaire response, 2026-08-25
Solving the crimes ALPR is sold on. ALPR is marketed as a stolen-vehicle tool, but the honest fix for auto theft is investigative capacity and prevention: funding the officers and analysts who work theft rings. Crisis response and diversion. A meaningful share of police calls involve mental health, addiction, and homelessness. Every dollar into properly resourced crisis teams and diversion programs frees up sworn officers for the work only they can do. That's a better public-safety return than a ALPR camera subscription. Environmental design. Street lighting, sightline improvements, and maintained public spaces are unglamorous, but crime prevention through environmental design has decades of evidence behind it. It protects everyone equally and surveils no one.
Q7 — FOI responsiveness — questionnaire response, 2026-08-25
Yes, without hesitation. Freedom of information is not a favour a city grants residents. It's the law and it's the mechanism that lets the public verify how the tools are being used. The test I'd apply is simple. If a program can only survive because the public can't see how it works, the problem is the program, not the requester.
Q8 — Message to voters — questionnaire response, 2026-08-25
This issue is not about being against police or against technology. It's about a line that matters in a free society: the government should investigate people suspected of something, not track everyone suspected of nothing.

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panopti.ca recommends candidates based on their documented stance on ALPR surveillance, but holds no position on — and neither endorses nor opposes — any candidate or party on the basis of any other issue. This tracker records only documented public statements about ALPR surveillance and does not reflect candidates' positions on any other issue.