London

Mobile ALPRs deployed

Andrew Crook

Ward 13 Councillor Candidate

Opposes ALPRs

Andrew Crook, a candidate for Ward 13 Councillor in London's October 2026 election, opposes fixed ALPR cameras. In his response to panopti.ca's questionnaire, Crook said his default position is "no to general expansion" and that he opposes routine tracking of citizens "simply because the technology exists" — while leaving the door open to a narrowly defined use at specific high-risk sites only where there is a strong public-safety case and less intrusive alternatives are inadequate. He calls for strong data limits, independent audits, mandatory public consultation and a public privacy impact assessment before any deployment, and caution about location data leaving Canada. His answers appear below in his own words.

Questionnaire responses

Q1 — Support or oppose fixed ALPRs — questionnaire response, 2026-08-20

Generally, I oppose broad deployment of fixed ALPR cameras. I could support limited use in specific high-risk locations, such as critical infrastructure or other clearly vulnerable sites, if there is a strong public-safety case. I do not support routine tracking of citizens' movements simply because the technology exists. Privacy is a right, and the burden should be on government to demonstrate why surveillance is necessary, proportionate, and effective.

Q2 — How would you vote on procurement? — questionnaire response, 2026-08-20

I would need to see the specific proposal, evidence of effectiveness, cost, privacy safeguards, and intended use. My default position would be no to general expansion. I could reconsider for a narrowly defined public-safety purpose where the benefits are clear and less intrusive alternatives are inadequate. I would not support a blank cheque for broader surveillance.

Q3 — Limits on ALPR data — questionnaire response, 2026-08-20

Strong limits. Data should be retained only as long as genuinely necessary, access should be restricted and logged, and misuse should carry consequences. I would want independent audits and regular public reporting showing how the system is being used, how often data is accessed, and whether it is actually producing measurable public-safety benefits.

Q4 — Data-sharing with other agencies — questionnaire response, 2026-08-20

Only under clearly defined legal circumstances and for a legitimate investigative purpose. I would oppose routine or bulk sharing of location data. I would be particularly cautious about data leaving Canada. Any sharing framework should be transparent, auditable, and limited to what is necessary for a specific lawful purpose.

Q5 — Public consultation & privacy assessment — questionnaire response, 2026-08-20

A significant one. Surveillance changes the relationship between citizens and government, so people should know what is being proposed before it is purchased. I would support public consultation and a public privacy impact assessment before any major deployment or expansion. Citizens should be able to understand the purpose, risks, safeguards, costs, and expected benefits before council makes a decision.

Q6 — Where the money should go — questionnaire response, 2026-08-20

That would depend on the demonstrated need. My preference would be to invest in measures that directly improve public safety: visible policing where required, community-based prevention, better response capacity, and practical supports for recurring problem areas. I would rather fund measurable outcomes than technology simply because it is available.

Q7 — FOI responsiveness — questionnaire response, 2026-08-20

Yes, subject to legitimate legal exemptions involving active investigations, personal information, or public safety. Citizens should be able to understand what surveillance technology their government is using, how it is being used, what it costs, and what safeguards exist. Transparency is essential to maintaining public trust.

Q8 — Message to voters — questionnaire response, 2026-08-20

Technology should serve citizens, not quietly redefine the relationship between citizens and government. I am not opposed to technology or legitimate police tools. I am opposed to normalizing broad surveillance without a compelling reason. If government wants to track people's movements, the question should never be "Can we?" It should be "Why is this necessary, and is there a less intrusive way?"

Are you this candidate, or do you have documentation we're missing? Email [email protected] and we'll review and update this page.

panopti.ca recommends candidates based on their documented stance on ALPR surveillance, but holds no position on — and neither endorses nor opposes — any candidate or party on the basis of any other issue. This tracker records only documented public statements about ALPR surveillance and does not reflect candidates' positions on any other issue.

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